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This paper examines the political economic and governance challenges faced by African
governments in operationalizing Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA) as part of their pursuit
of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). There is a need to enrich
our understanding of the diverse contexts and ways in which governments will have to
navigate and address the inevitable choices and conflicts, synergies and trade-offs that
will characterize efforts to simultaneously implement these global goals. Here we seek
to develop an account of why and how countries are managing the interrelationship
between SDGs, particularly those associated with food security and climate action. We
develop explanations for the diversity in approaches and provide an initial assessment
of what the consequences are for policy and practice. The analysis is informed by the
contrasting experiences of four Eastern African countries, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and
Rwanda, as they seek to build more “climate resilient” food and agricultural systems that
are compatible with achieving the SDGs.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the political economic and governance challenges faced by African
governments in operationalizing Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA) as part of their pursuit of the
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). CSA has received growing attention in
research and policy debates over recent years (Lipper et al., 2014; Karlsson et al., 2018; Newell and
Taylor, 2018), and the SDGs increasingly form a key part of the policy goals for many governments
(Chirambo, 2018; Haywood et al., 2018). Despite the shared priorities and concerns of many
states when it comes to delivering on CSA and SDGs, less is known about the diverse contexts
and ways in which governments will have to navigate the inevitable choices and conflicts and
synergies and trade-offs to simultaneously implement the global goals, ranging from economic
growth to land and water management, and from food and nutrition security to energy access.
Beyond mapping linkages, overlaps and areas of contestation, we need an account of why and how
countries are pursuing particular initiatives and strategies to manage the interrelationship among
different policy goals. This can provide an explanation of the diversity in approach and perhaps
most critically, offer an assessment of what the consequences of this are for achieving the intended
(and unintended) outcomes.
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Here we look at the contrasting experience of four Eastern
African countries; Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Rwanda, as
they seek to build more “climate resilient” or “climate smart”
agricultural systems that are compatible with the SDGs, including
efforts to simultaneously enhance food security and improve
climate action. These countries were chosen to illustrate contexts
in which both CSA (in different forms) and SDGs figure
prominently in government policy and activities on the ground,
and as countries which, despite many similarities, also typify
different governance and development models.
Our starting point is that despite the promise of “triple-wins”
around poverty alleviation, climate mitigation and adaptation
that is associated with CSA (c.f. FAO, 2013a, 2014, 2017a),
conflicts and contestations arise around attempts to govern
multiple and interconnected policy goals, as demonstrated e.g.,
in relation to the governance of the “nexus” around water,
energy and food (Scott, 2017; Weitz et al., 2017; Allouche et al.,
2019). Thus, achieving “climate smart” agriculture in ways which
align with other SDGs and with regional commitments, such
as those emanating from the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture
Development Programme (CAADP) of the African Union, is a
complex challenge. Regional and international bodies often have
different visions for the future of agricultural development, which
in turn has implications for national government policy and
programming (Karlsson et al., 2018; Newell and Taylor, 2018).
To understand how these processes play out in different
contexts, there is therefore a need to unpack the role of
power relations, diverse systems of governance, the uneven
insertion of national economies into regional and global political
economies, as well as the role of knowledge brokers in shaping
whose knowledge informs decision-making and choices about
what constitutes CSA, and ultimately, which impacts should be
measured and according to whose criteria.
In this paper, we account for differences in the ways in which
decision-makers in Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Rwanda have
sought to address these challenges through a framework which
illuminates the crucial importance of four key dimensions: (i)
governance and the role of the state, including the nature of
bureaucratic politics and the history of state involvement in the
agricultural sector (ii) the politics of translation, domestication
and the role of sub-national level actors including the role of
different levels of decentralization and democratization (iii)
policy autonomy and developmental space and how these are
affected by the organization of the agricultural sector in the
country and levels of aid dependence and trading relationships
which affect the degree of developmental space available to states
(iv) the political economy of knowledge, focusing in particular
on the role of global institutions; whose expertise frames policy
options and representations of CSA, and whose metrics and
indicators are preferred to measure performance against agreed
targets (see Table 1).
We focus here on these aspects firstly, because of the central
role of the state as the actor with the formal responsibility to
deliver and report on the SDGs and the significance of different
systems of governance in terms of how potentially competing
goals relate to existing distributions of power across government
and ministries charged with delivering on them. Secondly,
how global and regional commitments are translated and
implemented in practice is a function of who participates in and
shapes policy and the degree of devolution and decentralization
that exists in a country. Thirdly, the extent to which states can
act independently and autonomously in deciding on the future
agricultural development of their economies is a function of
the trading and aid relationships they have with other countries
that have a major stake in which pathway is pursued. Fourthly,
knowledge politics has a key role to play in shaping decision-
making and evaluation about what counts as “climate smart”
agriculture and building scientific consensus about viable options
that seek to inform policy.
Empirical material in the paper is used to explore and
highlight the value of this framework and compare it against
the World Bank’s CSA Policy Index (World Bank, 2016, 2018).
Though these are clearly not the only explanations for diversity
in SDG implementation, we argue that they offer a useful starting
point for understanding the everyday politics of realizing the
goals in practice.
We examine the experiences of our four focal countries in
relation to these four dimensions in the coming sections, starting
with a brief review of the broader context in which agriculture
and climate change are being addressed at the international level
in relation to the SDGs. The analysis is a based on analyses across
the four countries, written up in separate papers (Ruangwa,
submitted to this Research Topic; Mahmoud, submitted to this
Research Topic; Ndaki, submitted to this Research Topic; and
Teshome, submitted to this Research Topic).
Climate Change and Agriculture
The intimate relationship between climate change and
agriculture is increasingly well-recognized in expert and
policy circles. Agriculture is amongst the most significant
contributors to climate change, accounting for between 19
and 29% of total greenhouse gas emissions (Vermeulen et al.,
2012). Agriculture is also one of the sectors most vulnerable to
the effects of climate change; consuming some 70% of global
freshwater (Braimoh, 2013) and providing subsistence for circa
2.5 billion people globally who depend upon agriculture for
their livelihood (FAO, 2013b). In our case study countries, the
percentage of population employed primarily in agriculture
ranges from 38.1% in Kenya to 69% in Ethiopia (FAO, 2018). The
impacts of climate change on agriculture in Sub Saharan Africa
are expected to be severe, though the levels of vulnerability varies
between regions in the countries in question and by factors such
as predominant crop type (Adhikari et al., 2015). Nonetheless,
the combined impacts on subsistence farming, employment and
the regional economy of forecasted climate change scenarios will
be serious. Moreover, while climate change affects all countries,
it is notable that the impacts of climate change are differently
distributed amongst regions, generations, age classes, income
groups, and occupations (Olsson et al., 2014).
The Fifth Assessment Report of the United Nations
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC (2014)
noted that climate change-driven impacts often act as a threat
multiplier, compounding other drivers of poverty (Olsson
et al., 2014). Many vulnerable and poor people are dependent
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TABLE 1 | A framework for understanding the governance of SDGs.
Governance and the role of the
state
The politics of translation,




Political economy of knowledge
State power and resources Process of domesticating global
and regional commitments
Material base of the economy and
the centrality of agriculture
Role of global institutions and
knowledge brokers
* Shapes ability to lead and implement
visions for CSA.
* Manifest in planning and
priority-setting on CSA.
* Explains why global and regional
initiatives on CSA look so different
once refracted through domestic
institutions, policymaking processes
and political bargaining.
* Manifest in how governments
domesticate their international
commitments and align them with
domestic agendas.
* The high dependence of these
countries on agriculture for growth
explains why policy in this area is high
politics.
* Manifest in regional commitments
such as CAADP to boost expenditure
on agriculture and increase
private investment.
* Control of knowledge about CSA held
by actors that finance initiatives in
this area confers significant agenda-
setting power on those actors to
shape outcomes.
* Manifest in role of consultants,
advisors, trainers in delivering and
evaluating programmes according to
their preferred indicators of success.
Ideology/history of state vs. market
in agricultural development
Level of democratization and
channels for participation and
consultation
Insertion in regional and global
political economy of trade,
production and finance
Whose expertise? Relative power of
types of actors
* Shapes expectations and roles of
public and private actors in delivering
on CSA.
* Manifest in roles given to actors in
delivering CSA projects and initiatives.
* Shapes whose voices get heard and
reflects degree of central state control
over policy on CSA.
* Manifest in degree of participation in
policy of civil society and farmers’
organizations and the private sector.
* Shapes ability of state to depart from
preferences of donors and private
investors on CSA.
* Manifest in policies which reflect
donor priorities and create an
enabling environment for
private investors.
* Shapes what counts as CSA and gets
evaluated.
* Manifest in technical support, training,




Degrees of decentralization and
devolution
Developmental space What counts as “Climate Smart
Agriculture?”
* Shapes who participates in policy
and which ministries and preferences
prevail in CSA-related strategies.
* Manifest in battles over authority to
manage CSA and finance to
support it.
* Shapes balance of power and
authority over CSA relevant policy
between central and local state
(counties and local government
authorities).
* Manifest in struggles over resources
and delegation of
responsibility downwards.
* Shapes scope for pro-poor
interventions on climate change and
agriculture, which might depart from
donor or investor preferences.
* Manifest in conflicts over policy
priorities and allocations of funding
and high levels of representation of
donors in policy fora.
* Shapes what gets funded and acted
upon and what gets neglected.
* Manifest in development of national
CSA strategies, contests over which
metrics and indices are the right ones
and the active presence of key
international institutions in capital
cities in the region.
on activities such as agriculture that are highly susceptible to
temperature increases and variability in precipitation patterns
(Miyan, 2015). Thus, even modest changes in rainfall and
temperature patterns can push marginalized people into poverty
as they lack the means to recover from shocks. Extreme
events, such as floods, droughts, and heat waves, especially
when they occur in combination, can significantly erode poor
peoples’ assets and further undermine their livelihoods in
terms of labor productivity, housing, infrastructure, and social
networks (Olsson et al., 2014).
The impacts of climate change on food security, combined
with the influence of food and agriculture over our collective
ability to dramatically lower greenhouse gas emissions, has
been recognized by policymakers, and a suite of policies
which attempt to square increasing agricultural production with
mitigating climate change, as well as becoming more resilient
to its effects, have since followed. The regional analysis of the
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for Eastern Africa
by the FAO shows that 16 out of 18 countries include the
agriculture and/or Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry
(LULUCF) sector in overall mitigation contributions, while all
18 countries include the agriculture and LULUCF sectors in
the adaptation component of their NDCs (FAO, 2017b). The
focus on agriculture had increased steadily from the mid to
late 2000s, with particular attention given to agriculture-climate
change linkages during the Durban 2011 Conference of the
Parties (COP), including attempts to set up a separate Agriculture
Working Programme under the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC). While this attempt failed, the focus
on agriculture has continued to grow, with the Conference of
the Parties (COP 22) in Marrakech in 2016 dubbed by some
as the “Action for Agriculture COP” (CTA, 2016), which was
followed by the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture set up
at the subsequent COP 23 in Bonn 2017, underscoring the
importance of the agriculture sector in adapting to andmitigating
climate change.
The Sustainable Development Goals, agreed in 2015, explicitly
recognized the “integrated and indivisible” interconnections
between sustainability goals, and are novel in the extent to
which they attempt to move beyond traditional policy siloes
(United Nations, 2015). In particular, the nexus between food,
water, energy and climate change is a key example of the
need to maximize synergies while minimizing trade-offs between
inter-related sustainability issues. Moreover, policies at the
regional level, such as the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture
Development Programme (CAADP), the Africa Union’s flagship
development programme to promote agricultural transformation
across the region, has also sought to address climate change. For
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example, CAADP hosted the first Africa Climate-Smart Alliance
during UN Climate Week 2014, which is aligned to the CAADP
framework that seeks to balance trade-offs between economic
growth and sustainability.
Despite near consensus surrounding the importance of an
integrated approach to climate-resilient agriculture and the
existence of opportunities to capitalize on synergies, however,
there are a number of crucial trade-offs (Lipper et al., 2014;
Karlsson et al., 2018)—for example between the need for water
and forest conservation vs. the need to expand agricultural land
and provide irrigation (Khan and Akhtar, 2015). Yet pre-existing
policy approaches for climate-resilient agriculture such as CSA
give few clues for policymakers on how to effectively address the
governance challenges inherent in the inter-sectoral focus which
climate-resilient agricultural systems require. Moreover, they
make little mention of the ways in which policy and governance
frameworks would need to adapt in order to successfully
implement such synergistic policies, nor of the complex process
through which such international goals are domesticated by
national governments (Newell et al., 2018).
This lack of clarity highlights the need to explore what
happens when global initiatives on climate change and
development intersect with national policy contexts with their
diversity of actors, interests and politics. It is critical to take
account of (i) how decisions are made in practice; (ii) how
outcomes are a function of the relations of power and policy
networks that shape the prospects of realizing climate change
and development goals; (iii) how global drivers of national
level climate change debates open up and close down different
development pathways; and (iv) how climate change and
development outcomes look very different depending on how
they are defined and who defines them (Naess et al., 2015).
Given this, the paper addresses the question of how countries
navigate such different contexts in pursuing strategies for
climate resilient agriculture in line with the SDGs. This raises
important questions about how countries “domesticate” regional
and international agreements on sustainability and agricultural
transformation (such as CAADP and the SDGs) at national
level; whose knowledge counts and whose understandings and
priorities prevail in defining the “problem” and possible policy
response to it; and how trade-offs and conflicts between different
pathways around food and agriculture, energy and water are
identified, recognized and acted upon (or neglected) and by
whom. This in turn implies attention to who participates in or is
excluded from decision-making on these initiatives and projects
and how far governance systems handling the food-energy-water
interactions are shaped and influenced by external actors (such
as global institutions and donor agencies). It draws attention to
the ways in which the conflicts and trade-offs between CAADP
and the SDGs are currently being handled at national level, the
consequences of these choices and of course who is affected by
these consequences.
The following section introduces the theoretical framework,
followed by an empirical analysis of four dimensions that we
argue help explain differences and similarities in the governance
of climate resilient agriculture across the four countries,
namely the role of the state, the politics of translation, policy
autonomy and developmental space, and the political economy
of knowledge. We conclude by reflecting on the implications
of the findings and arguing for a more explicit “foregrounding”
of the politics involved in trying to balance often widely





There is a growing literature looking at the SDGs and their
governance in general, as well as national level analysis of
implementation efforts, such as enquiries into the coherence
between the water and agriculture sectors against climate
change adaptation goals outlined in national development
plans (England et al., 2018). Thus, there has been growing
emphasis on “synergies” and “nexuses.” Yet meeting the SDGs
simultaneously brings into sharp relief the trade-offs between
them and presents potentially unprecedented challenges for
governments in terms of how to design policies and processes
that afford a holistic view of their interaction and impact on
other resource areas. As Biermann et al. (2017, p. 26) put
it, “while the SDGs hold a great potential, their collective
success will depend on a number of institutional factors, such
as the extent to which states . . . strengthen related global
governance arrangements, translate the global ambitions into
national contexts, integrate sectoral policies, and maintain
flexibility in governance mechanisms.” Likewise, as Weitz et al.
(2017) argue, while the literature on the nexus around water-
energy-food identifies barriers to achieving coherence, it tends
to do so without exploring why barriers are present, and what
influences them, while ignoring the non-linearity and complexity
of governance processes. Key barriers to policy coherence include
the unequal distribution of power, voice, access to information,
resources, and capability among actors and institutions that
inevitably derive from a political process of negotiation among
unequal partners (Allouche et al., 2019).
What is missing then, is a deeper analysis of the politics
and political economy of why countries are following particular
pathways in addressing SDGs the way they do. Not merely
noting the differences, but building frameworks of understanding
to account for those differences and how, why and for whom
they matter. To develop such an analysis we carried out a
study across four countries with different systems of governance
in relation to the role of the state and civil society, degrees
of decentralization, and democratization, diverse forms of
integration with the global economy, and differences in the
degree and nature of expertise involved in shaping CSA policy
with a view to building a framework for understanding some of
the key differences in approach between countries (see Table 1).
In particular in relation to our first cross-cutting theme on
governance and the role of the state we look at: state power
and resources; the role of ideology regarding the state, market
and agricultural development and the nature of policy processes
and bureaucratic politics. Regarding our second theme on the
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politics of translation, domestication and the role of sub-national
level actors in domesticating their international commitments
and aligning them with domestic agendas we explore level of
democratization and channels for participation and consultation
as well as degrees of de-centralization and devolution. In relation
to theme three on policy autonomy and developmental space
we explore: the nature of the agricultural resources—their value
and centrality to growth the degree of state intervention in the
economy; levels of aid dependence; the nature of a country’s
insertion in regional and global political economy and the degree
of developmental space a country enjoys. Regarding our fourth
and final theme on the political economy of knowledge we assess:
the role of global institutions and knowledge brokers; questions
of knowledge politics and expertise and different interpretations
of what counts as climate-smart agriculture.
To make sense of these different dimensions our conceptual
framework draws on literature across three complementary
theoretical areas. Firstly, in order to understand governance and
the role of the state in relation to managing SDG implementation
in relation to climate and agriculture we draw on work on policy
processes (Keeley and Scoones, 2003) and the political economy
of climate compatible development (Quan et al., 2014; Tanner
et al., 2014; Naess et al., 2015; Phillips et al., 2017). This helps
us to understand the relations of power which “mediate the
winners, losers and potential trade-offs between different goals,
and the political and institutional factors which enable or inhibit
integration across different policy areas” (Naess et al., 2015: 534).
From this perspective, policy development and implementation
processes are best described as incremental, complex and
“messy,” involving actors with often competing goals and
interests, which deploy knowledge and expertise in strategic ways
(Keeley and Scoones, 2003; Tanner and Allouche, 2011).
Secondly, we engage with work on the “politics of translation”
(Newell, 2008) and the “domestication” of global commitments
to sustainable development. Here the term “polycentric
governance” has been used to describe how a given policy
or intervention blends together actors across different scales
of implementation that fuse the agency and funds of public
and private actors (Cole, 2015; Sovacool et al., 2017). More
specifically in relation to climate change, we engage with
insights from political ecology and political economy to climate
change adaptation in particular (Taylor, 2015; Sovacool and
Linnér, 2016), and to climate-resilient and climate-compatible
development in general (Rai and Fisher, 2016; Nunan, 2017). We
highlight the value of political ecology approaches that “situate
local processes within a multi-scalar series of causal forces”
[(Taylor, 2015), p. 5].
Thirdly, to appreciate the economic and structural dynamics
which impact upon countries’ degree of policy autonomy and
developmental space to manage the synergies and trade-offs
around climate change and agriculture in ways which align
with domestic priorities, we draw on insights from the political
economy of development (Wade, 2003; Gallagher, 2005). These
help to illustrate that the ways in which trade-offs between SDGs
are resolved is a function of factors such as a country’s location
in the global political economy (e.g., level of aid dependence
and flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) and how much
policy autonomy exists to address the tensions inherent in
the SDGs in ways that accord with domestic priorities, rather
than the preferences of donors and transnational agribusiness
actors. Where they are heavily aid dependent and tied to the
agendas of development banks, it becomes easier to understand
how the predominance of market-liberal framings that we
observe globally gets replicated regionally and nationally through
CAADP and national CSA strategies (Newell et al., 2018).
Finally, to understand how knowledge frames policy,
pathways and understandings of what counts as climate resilient
agriculture in a development context, we draw on emerging
literature examining concepts, synergies as well as trade-offs.
The idea of linking adaptation, mitigation and development
gained momentum first with the concept of “development
first” (Beg et al., 2002; Davidson et al., 2003), and has
since taken the form of policy goals, including low carbon
climate resilient development (Ellis and Baker, 2009); climate
compatible development (Mitchell and Maxwell, 2010), and
even Climate Smart Agriculture (FAO, 2013a). This has been
followed by, over the past few years, assessments of evidence of
efforts to implement such “triple wins,” including more critical
research on trade-offs (e.g., Suckall et al., 2014; Nunan, 2017;
Karlsson et al., 2018).
We undertake an analysis of how Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia
and Rwanda are approaching policies for “climate-smart” or
“climate-resilient” agriculture in order to illustrate the value of
a framework combining the three elements described above.
Though facing similar generic challenges around how to build
more climate resilient and compatible agricultural systems,
these countries afford useful insights around the importance
of state-led development pathways (Ethiopia, Tanzania, and
Rwanda) vs. more market-led approaches (Kenya), different
degrees of decentralization (e.g., Kenya vs. Ethiopia), different
degrees of space for civil society participation, and varying
degrees of donor dependence. We focus in turn on governance
and the role of the state, the politics of translation, policy
autonomy and development space in terms of the position of
these countries within global relations of aid and trade and
finally knowledge politics and the role of expertise in shaping
pathways. The research was undertaken through an analysis of
key policy documents, discourse analysis of dominant framings, a
participatory workshop involving participants from each country
case study and interviews with key actors involved in developing
policies in the climate and agriculture domains including policy
makers, government agency staff, donor staff and researchers (see
above-mentioned country case study papers for further detail).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Governance and the Role of the State
National policy contexts with their diverse set of actors, interests,
and politics are a useful place to begin to understand the
varying dynamics and approaches taken to shaping climate
resilient agricultural policies (Naess et al., 2015). A common
feature across the four countries in question is the approach of
state-led development frameworks and “visions” such as Kenya
Vision 2030, Tanzania Vision 2025, Rwanda Vision 2020, and
the Ethiopia Growth and Transformation Plan 2025, of which
the Climate Resilient Green Economy Plan is a component.
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Whilst each state-led vision or plan is distinct, a common
theme across these four countries is the aspiration to forge
new development models; incorporating the challenge of climate
change and sustainable development, whilst at the same time
targeting ambitious rapid economic growth, such as planning to
achievemiddle-income country status over the course of the plan.
Such strategies reveal some of the dynamics of governing
the complex trade-offs around the relationship between climate
change and agriculture. In Ethiopia, for example, the Climate
Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) is a key climate strategy that
guides other growth and development plans (FDRE, 2012). The
strategy recognizes that Ethiopia will be highly vulnerable to the
impacts of climate change. The vision is to build a middle income
economy by 2025 in a way that is both resilient to the negative
impacts of climate change, while at the same time reduces
greenhouse gas emissions to achieve; “...adaptation to climate
change and mitigation of greenhouse gases emissions, reducing
greenhouse gas emission through enhancing productivity of the
crop and livestock sub-sectors that improve food security and
income of farmers and pastoralists, protecting and rehabilitation
of forests for their economic and ecosystem services” (National
Planning Commission, 2015, p. 14–15). The strategy has four
major pillars, each with lead institutions including agriculture
and livestock; water and energy; industry and transport; and
health. Each institution and region is expected to establish a
CRGE Coordination Unit within the Environment, Forest and
Climate Change Directorate or Bureau.
Kenya’s Climate Smart Agriculture Program (CSAP 2015-
2030) envisions “a climate resilient and low carbon growth
sustainable agriculture that ensures food security and contributes
to national development goals in line with Kenya Vision 2030”
and also is thought to be crucial for coordinating domestic and
international CSA interventions. In the preparation of the CSAP
(2015–2030) Kenya combined the efforts of two ministries—
the Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources and the
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries. Technical and
financial support were obtained from a wide range of sources
including NEPAD Climate Change Fund, Common Market
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African
Community (EAC), and the CGIAR Research Program on
Climate Change, Agriculture, and Food Security (CCAFS). The
four strategic priorities of CSAP are (i) create national systems
to enhance CSA best practices, technologies and approaches; (ii)
create value chain systems in which both the public and private
sector become important actors; (iii) support demand-driven
research for development and innovation; and (iv) improve and
sustain agricultural advisory services.
In Tanzania, and in addition to the Vision 2025, the
government has sought to align responses to climate change and
the promotion of CSA with broader investment and industrial
strategies. Initiatives include the finalization of the Agricultural
Sector Development Programme (ASDP II), which is intended
to run for from 2017–2026 taking into account climate change.
There is also the Agriculture Sector Environment Action Plan
aimed at promoting sustainable production; the Climate Smart
Agriculture Programme; and the Tanzania Agriculture and Food
Security Investment Plan which also identifies climate change
as an issue of concern. Climate Smart Agriculture Guidelines to
guide implementation of the CSA Programme (2015–2025) have
also been developed, identifying six strategic priorities as sources
of Tanzania’s agricultural development and growth in a changing
climate, as follows: (1) improved productivity and income;
(2) building resilience and associated mitigation co-benefits;
(3) value chain integration; (4) research for development and
innovations; (5) improving and sustaining agricultural advisory
services; and (6) improved institutional coordination.
In pursuing these goals and dealing with agriculture’s relation
to other sectors, states have sought external funding. For
example, the Simiyu Climate Resilience project in Tanzania with
KfW Development Bank was recently approved by the Green
Climate Fund Board with financing of US$102.7 million and
concentrates on ensuring water availability for farming and other
uses. Likewise, the Resilient Natural Resources Management
for Growth (REGROW) project is being implemented in rice
production schemes to encourage farmers to sustainably use
water for irrigation. Most of these initiatives are funded by
the donor community through multilateral, bilateral, and other
arrangements, while some are government funded. Why this
matters in terms of policy autonomy is addressed further below.
In Rwanda meanwhile, the government has over the last
decade intensively embarked on investments in CSA practices
such as land husbandry, water harvesting, and hillside irrigation
to increase resilience to climate change, reduce water erosion and
soil loss, halt land degradation, and increase land productivity.
Programmes that mitigate emissions such as one cow per poor
family, zero grazing and the use of droppings for household
bio-gas production in intensive livestock systems have also been
implemented. Agroforestry has also been promoted, whereby the
government have pledged to restore 2 million of hectares of
land mainly through agroforestry. Government initiatives also
include the development of the Rwanda National Strategy on
Climate Change and Low Carbon Economy in 2011 (REMA, 2011)
and the establishment of a green fund (FONERWA) to support
green growth in Rwanda over the next 50 years while serving as
touchstone for Africa and the rest of the world.
What these national strategies and plans often disguise are
the bureaucratic turf wars between ministries or, more benignly,
the contested division of labor among them, which lie behind
the production of these strategy documents and which set in
train their implementation. For example, an officer from the
Vice President’s Office-Division of Environment in Tanzania
commented that the “power struggle within departments and
institutions leads to and/or intensifies conflicts [where] each one
would like to be seen as a winner.” Similarly, according to a
key informant from the Ministry of Industry, “industry focuses
more on mitigation than adaptation and agriculture the other
way round” (pers comm. 2017). Besides differences in mandate
and approach to the issue, there are often clear bureaucratic
power imbalances which underlie these tensions. In Rwanda,
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN)
is centrally involved in the process of domestication of
international commitment such as the SDGs. It provides
orientation from the integration of SDGs into sector strategy up
to the level of its reporting. It has already, through the support
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of the UN, carried out a SDGs Assessment Report showing
indicators and targets already incorporated in the national
planning system. It highlights what each sector is supposed to
respond to. Agriculture and environment sectors have specific
goals within SDGs goals with indicators and targets that need to
be incorporated and addressed in their planning processes.
In other cases, bureaucratic politics are reflected in
sector-based planning which undermines the prospects of
more integrated and holistic ways of thinking about SDG
implementation. Lack of policy coherence also results from
conflicts within governments (horizontal governance) as well as
across levels of governance (vertical governance) over authority,
priorities and resources. In this way, narrowly conceived sectoral
policies can undermine integrated development pathways by
failing to take into account other sectors’ interests, meaning that
sector-based planning disaggregates stakeholders’ demands and
development objectives into food and agriculture, energy, and
water. In addition, sector budgeting and implementation induces
duplication of efforts and minimizes the chances of tapping
opportunities for a more holistic approach to development
pathways. In Tanzania, for example, a representative from the
Economic and Productive Sector-President’s Office, Regional
Administration and Local Governments put it as follows: “The
challenge we have had as a country at both national and local
levels, is that we always plan sector-wise and not integrative.
That is why during implementation we have conflicts among and
between sectors” (pers comm. 2017).
The Politics of Translation, Domestication
and the Role of Sub-national Level Actors
Another key area of state power, building on the theme of
autonomy, is the politics of translation (Newell, 2008). This
refers to the processes and means by which governments
domesticate regional and international commitments. It helps
us to understand why global initiatives around CSA or the
SDGS or regional ones such as CAADP look so different once
refracted through domestic institutions, policymaking processes
and political bargaining.
Ethiopia was one of the first countries to sign up to
the Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security
in 2003 [Assembly/AU/Decl.7(II)] when African Heads of
State and Government initiated the Comprehensive Africa
Agricultural Development Programme, but its own national
CAADP Compact required a lengthy process of consultation
and was not signed until 2009. After the country found itself
behind neighboring states in meeting its commitments, the
Policy and Investment Framework (PIF) was introduced in 2009–
10. The PIF helped to translate the four CAADP pillars into
the Ethiopian context. Presently, a process is underway to
prepare Ethiopia’s National Agricultural Investment Framework
(NAIF) which aims to “domesticate” the Malabo Declaration on
Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared
Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods [Assembly/AU/2(XXIII)]
(African Union, 2015). That declaration, which was adopted by
African Heads of State and Government at the 23rd African
Union (AU) Summit in 2014, repositioned agriculture as a
priority on the continental development agenda and reaffirmed
the CAADP commitments for another 10 years.
Likewise, the Head of the Environmental Section in the
Ministry of Agriculture in Tanzania suggests the key elements
of the CSA programme derive directly from regional and
international agreements. “Our new policy, the Climate Smart
Agriculture Programme, and the Resilience Plan are all a
reflection of the CAADP, the Climate Change Convention and
other international and regional agreements on environment,
climate change and sustainable development” (pers comm.
2018). The fact that these agreements demand and require
very different things that may be in tension with one another
is not acknowledged in this instance. Hence, while the
climate regime demands sharp reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions, CAADP and regional common market organizations
prioritize new growth opportunities through the intensification
of expert-oriented and often emissions-intensive forms of
agricultural production.
To some extent, the nature of implementation is set by
the agreement itself. As a representative from the Division of
Environment in Vice President’s Office in Tanzania comments,
for example: “Domestication of international agreements is done
depending on the nature and requirement of the agreement
itself. There are agreements which require cabinet approval;
others require ratification by the parliament, while others may
not even require taking them to the cabinet or parliament”
(pers. comm. 2018).
Nevertheless, interested external parties associated with these
agreements can exercise considerable influence in ensuring
that governments implement the agreements according to
their preferences. For example, the CAADP Secretariat at the
African Union Commission has provided technical support to
Rwanda through organizing and conducting trainings of local
experts and ensuring a CAADP Country Team exists with
public, private and civil society involvement. Furthermore, the
secretariat has developed guidelines for countries on how to
domesticate CAADP performance indicators. Secondly, each
country has responsibility to report once in every 2 years on the
implementation progress of CAADP commitments. Upon the
reporting, a new scorecard rating methodology is being used to
rate the country performance against the established indicators.
This kind of ranking and disciplining of countries according to
their delivery on investment targets is revealing of an important
power dynamic and perhaps provides stronger incentives to meet
CAADP targets than to ensure their compatibility with SDG goals
over which there is currently less formal oversight.
The domestication of international and regional agreements
has had a number of influences on approaches to food and
agricultural policy formulation and implementation. As a result
of agreements such as the CAADP, there is currently increased
investment by governments and other stakeholders, such as
the private sector, in the agriculture sector. These investments
can take different forms, such as supply of subsidized inputs,
employment of agricultural extension staff to farmers in rural
areas, supply of subsidized machinery for cultivation, processing
and value addition of agricultural produce and provision of
extension and advisory services to farmers, including provision
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of climate services to support adaptation. The assumption is
that this will attract agro-based investments thereby increasing
commercially oriented agricultural production. Indeed, there is
an increased role for the private sector in various ways such
as through supply of inputs in order to increase productivity
at the local level; promotion of large scale farming in order
to transform agricultural production for assurance of food and
nutrition security; agro-processing, in line with strategies for
industrial development; and marketing of agricultural produce
and agro-processed products.
Though many of these patterns of domestication are similar
across all the country cases, degrees of democratization, and
openness to public participation do differ, with important
implications for whether, how and by whom trade-offs are
negotiated and resolved. In terms of civil society, for example,
the “Climate Change Forum Ethiopia” (CCF-E) was launched in
2007 initiated by Oxfam America and endorsed by the Federal
Government. By 2013, CCF-E had grown into an initiative
with over 100 individual and organizational members. Its main
objective is to advance advocacy in the area of climate change
adaptation and mitigation, through research and awareness
raising campaigns on climate change issues. Its research aims
to inform policy at the national and international levels and
provide the government with research and policy analysis for
the UNFCCC negotiations. CCF-E collaborates with government
institutions, such as the Ministry of Agriculture, and Natural
Resources, to carry out climate change vulnerability assessments
and to implement projects aimed at reducing vulnerability. At the
same time, Berhanu and Poulton (2014) have observed that since
2005 the Ethiopian Government has sought to control the policy
advocacy activities of non-government organizations through
a mandatory re-registration process. Due to this constraining
environment, beyond examples such as CCF-E, the participation
of civil society organizations (CSO) has diminished, shifting the
balance of power toward the government, such that key decisions
remain in the hands of the government. For example, none of the
non-governmental or donor organizations are named on the list
of institutions assigned to lead or support the implementation of
the adaptation plan for climate change.
The absence of significant civil society participation in state
decision-making in countries such as Ethiopia, or its selective
engagement in other countries in the region, carries important
implications for which voices get represented in debates about
agriculture and climate change. Patterns of exclusion affect in
particular the groups that are most vulnerable to climate change,
as well as the policies set up to address it. Many of the policies
affect the smallholder farmers, fisher communities as well as
pastoral and agro-pastoral communities, but they themselves are
not part of the decisions. Similarly, in 2005 the decision of the
Government of Tanzanian to evict all pastoral and agro-pastoral
communities from one area in the southern highlands (URT,
2006, 2009) was criticized due to lack of consultations and poor
preparations of the areas where the evicted pastoralists would be
taken. Speaking of the fate of pastoralism in Tanzania, Kateka
(2016, p. 173) suggests that “Pastoralists are not sufficiently
involved in policy making, local government planning processes;
village and district level plans often do not benefit from, or
support, their productive strategies.” Hence, much as the local
communities are among those most seriously vulnerable to
climate change and those most directly affected by decisions to
govern natural resource use, they are frequently overlooked or
actively bypassed in state decision-making at all levels.
But spaces have also opened up for some farmers’
organizations. In Tanzania, this includes farmers and their
farmer or pastoral organizations (both crop and animal
production), such as Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima
Tanzania (MVIWATA) (a national farmers’ organization), the
Agricultural Council of Tanzania (ACT), the Tanzania Chamber
of Commerce Industry and Agriculture (TCCIA), as well as
agro-industry and agro-processing actors, including agribusiness
dealers, exporters, processors, importers, distributors, service
providers, and related organizations, and financial institutions
directly or indirectly involved under the climate change and
agriculture umbrella. They are key to supporting farmers,
particularly with regard to accessing agricultural inputs from
the government and other private service providers. In terms of
their impact on policies, they currently have a particularly strong
influence at the local level where political rallies and meeting are
held especially during elections. Their agenda seems to be heard
strongly in parliamentary sessions and during political rallies.
Moreover, the process of domesticating international
programmes also creates openings for civil society actors to
hold governments to account for their delivery of commitments
contained in international agreements. As a representative from
the Division of Environment in the Vice President’s Office in
Tanzania commented: “Domesticating an agreement always
becomes like a pledge. This is because the process of negotiating,
adopting and domesticating is always open for other stakeholders
to follow at national level. Therefore, as soon as you domesticate,
it is like you have entered into agreement with stakeholders.
They will always be following up what you do to implement the
agreement. It is for this reason that you will always hear CSOs ask
the government what they have done to achieve the 10% of GDP
for the agriculture sector budgets as per the Maputo/Malabo
declaration, which intended to incentivize more investment in
agriculture while giving governments leeway in terms of how
exactly to prioritize and allocate these investments. This is a good
example of how the domestication triggers monitoring from part
of the players. Domestication is actually a commitment both
domestically and internationally” (pers. comm. 2018).
When considering the state it is important not to neglect
the sub-national level of decision-making authority where
important differences are observable across the country cases.
Local Government Authorities (LGAs) are important and key
in implementing policies and programmes. For example, the
National Agricultural Policy in Tanzania makes these LGAs
responsible for promoting social and economic development;
designing and implementing sector plans; supervising the
implementation of laws, statutes and regulations relevant
to the sector; supervising and coordinating the delivery of
extension services; mobilizing resources (financial, human
and facilities/equipment) for local development programmes;
administration of villages for the purpose of stimulating
sustained development; and land administration, land use
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planning and management for effective and sustainable land
utilization (URT, 2013).
In Rwanda meanwhile, all 30 Districts (local administrative
entities) usually develop their own District Development Plans
(DDPs) building on national sectoral targets. Districts, therefore,
have some autonomy to domesticate these national targets
according to local conditions and priorities. More specifically,
each district will respond to the national targets according
to the existing opportunities and challenges within their own
districts. For example, a rural district with relatively higher
land availability and having issues of increasing droughts
will have to prioritize the climate resilient agriculture actions
as set by the Rwandan Government’s Strategic Plan for
Agricultural Transformation 4 (PSTA4), covering the period
of 2018–2024.
Devolution and decentralization has gone furthest in Kenya,
however, following the introduction of a new constitution in
2010 that devolved power to a county level (Government of
Kenya, 2010). As it pertains to agriculture, although government
ministries have the responsibility to set the policy, implementing
agricultural policy is devolved to the county level. Because of
this, the ministries at a national level are solely responsible
for guiding policy and strategy, and not for reconciling the
synergies and trade-offs of CSA, or the inconsistencies and
disconnects between regional and international policy (Newell
et al., 2018). The impact of this is that the hard choices
are being passed down to a more local level, where more
contextualized decisions can be made, but fromwhere it is harder
to see the bigger picture, and where there is less technical and
administrative capacity.
Policy Autonomy and Developmental
Space
How the relationship between SDGs is governed and by whom in
relation to climate change and agriculture is not just a function
of government institutions, decision-making processes and the
politics of how commitments are translated into practice. Here
we also consider economic explanations including the material
base of the economy and how far it is reliant upon agriculture,
and in particular certain forms of agriculture, as well global
economic factors which help to determine the degree of policy
autonomy and developmental space countries have to develop
their preferred agricultural development pathway.
Firstly, it is important to appreciate just how central a
role agriculture plays in all of the economies considered. Yet
though the expansion of export-led industrial agriculture is
represented as a generic national interest, it belies a number
of potential trade-offs which take different forms at national
level. For example, in Tanzania, conflicts and trade-offs exist
between water and forest conservation and expansion of
agricultural land, irrigation and livestock production. Similarly,
in Ethiopia both small-scale agriculture, and more recently large-
scale investments, have accelerated the deforestation process
which contravenes the country’s carbon sequestration or storage
objectives (Sorecha, 2017).
In many countries in the region, the drive to commercialize
agriculture is producing new exclusions. For instance, Tanzania
has adopted a number of policies which aim to transform
agricultural production. Recently, the government has
concentrated on ensuring the country reaches a middle-
income status through the promotion of industrialization in
which revitalizing agricultural production is a key component
of achieving this goal. This involves a clear shift toward more
support for large scale farming rather than small scale farmers.
Some examples demonstrate this shift. In 2009, the Government
of Tanzanian adopted the Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First)
to accelerate agricultural transformation. The stated aim was
to modernize and commercialize agriculture in the country.
While this in principle involved both small- and large-scale
agriculture, the main focus in practice was on large-scale
commercial agriculture. The fifth pillar of the resolve focuses on
amending the Village Land Act of 1999 to open up the access
of village land to large scale investments. Therefore, through
the initiative, it will be easier for village land to be taken and
transferred to large-scale investors hence affecting smallholder
farmers who stand to lose (Vorley et al., 2012). Activities under
this pillar also include allocating land to a land bank, again with
the aim of facilitating land access for commercial operators.
To implement the initiative, the Southern Agricultural Growth
Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT), which is a public-private
partnership, was launched in 2010. Its aim is to catalyze private
investment and improve agricultural productivity with a focus
on the development of large-scale farming and the involvement
of small-scale producers in the supply chain. This has led to
concerns that it is going to open up arable land for commercial
operators leaving out the majority of smallholder farmers (Vorley
et al., 2012; Smalley, 2017).
Rwanda’s Fourth Strategic Plan for Agricultural
Transformation 2018–2024 concluded that increasing the
resilience of Rwanda’s productive system, including to climatic
risks, is a key determinant for sustainable production and
productivity increases and greater food and nutrition security.
Based on that, and strongly echoing development bank and
donor prescriptions around private-sector led transformations
in the agricultural sector, the strategy embraces different
climate smart initiatives across its four priority areas, namely
innovation and extension; productivity and resilience; inclusive
markets and value; enabling environment and responsive
institutions. This is unsurprising given that a task force
was established under MINAGRI leadership to guide the
development of PSTA 4, including membership from the
Rwanda Agriculture Board, the National Agricultural Export
Development Board NAEB, and a nucleus of development
partners (European Union, FAO, World Bank, UK Department
for International Development (DFID), and US Agency for
International Development (USAID). Additionally, this strategy
recognizes the multi-dimensional nature of the agricultural
sector with a reference to CAADP and the Malabo Declaration
Commitments, as well as the SDGs, through which a close
coordination of the agriculture sector with other relevant
ministries, the private sector, and civil society organizations
is critical.
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Developmental Space
The concept of “developmental space” is often used to describe
how much freedom of maneuver developing countries have
to pursue their preferred developmental pathways given the
constraints they face and their dependence on private capital
or foreign aid from more powerful countries (Wade, 2003;
Gallagher, 2005). This differs from the domestication and
translation described above in that its focus is on economic
relations and dependencies.
The economic position of countries in the region in terms of
trading relations and levels of aid dependence has a significant
impact on how trade-offs among the SDGs are handled and
governed. Deliberations about how to promote CSA in the
context of the SDGS do not take place in a vacuum. External
actors play an important role in advancing their preferences.
For example, Feed the Future, the major USAID initiative in
Ethiopia (and is being implemented in many African countries)
includes programmes such as the Value Chain Activity (Fintrac
Inc.) while DFID has a “Land Investment for Transformation
(LIFT) programme.” The objective of the programme is to
improve the incomes of the rural poor and vulnerable groups
in Ethiopia and enhance economic growth, through second-level
land certification, and improved rural land administration. The
programme team is working with the government of Ethiopia
to improve the effectiveness of the rural land sector through
increased security of land rights and to enhance the productivity
and incomes of the farmers, especially women and vulnerable
groups. The emphasis on securing property rights and enhancing
productivity for growth also resonates strongly with World Bank
approaches to the sector (Taylor, 2018).
There are a variety of mechanisms for building and
communicating the consensus of the donor community to
national governments. Development organizations in Ethiopia
engage with the Government collectively through three
coordination mechanisms such as the Rural Economy and Food
Security (RED&FS) SectorWorking Group and the Development
Assistance Group (DAG) which brings together all development
organizations supporting projects and programmes—small or
large. The third is the PSNP Donor Coordination Team (DCT)
hosted by the World Bank. It provides technical support to the
Food Security Coordination Directorate of the MoANR during
the design, implementation, and monitoring and review of
the program. In Tanzania, a similarly conceived Development
Partners Group on Environment, Natural Resources and Climate
Change (DPG-E) plays a key role in shaping policies and
supporting their implementation. In Rwanda, a Sub-Working
Group on Climate Change chaired by MINAGRI is co-chaired
by a DFID representative where key stakeholders exchange views
on how to inform and support the agriculture sector through
identified climate change challenges. The meetings are held on
a quarterly basis and development organizations include DFID,
FAO, the International Fund for Agricultural Development
(IFAD), USAID, and the World Bank, among others.
In general, these institutions play a central role in shaping
agricultural and environmental policies since they are actively
involved in policy and strategy formulation and implementation.
Furthermore, they are also closely involved during the
implementation of the strategic actions through designing
different projects in line with their interest and priorities. In
other words, the sector strategy priority actions are the ones
that theoretically drive the design and implementation of the
different development projects funded by donors, including the
ones addressing CSA. However, in reality according to most
interviewees, the donors’ priorities and interests come first
during the design and financing of projects.
The degree of autonomy from donor interests differs between
the countries, however. Whilst donors play a key role in
Kenya and Rwanda, in Ethiopia, when it comes to the
fundamental principles, structures and components of programs,
the government remains in control despite being heavily aid
dependent. This “autonomy” is enshrined in the developmental
state paradigm reflected in projects that have the potential to
organize society around its vision, and the autonomy to insulate
itself against the narrow interests of specific actors and to
secure broad support (Oqubay, 2015). With respect to climate
change, the government’s move has been very strategic. When
it became clear that the developed countries would compensate
the developing countries for their efforts to sequester carbon, the
Ethiopian government, in an opportunistic move, took the lead in
designing and launching the CRGE at the Durban (South Africa)
COP of 2011.
It is also the case in Tanzania that the historical legacy of an
interventionist state persists. Since the legislative system remains
dominated by the ruling party which also controls both the state
and the legislature (Elliott-Teague, 2007), the state dominates the
policy regime (Cooksey, 2012). The implication of this is mostly
felt in domestication of international agreements and policy
making where some groups do not fully participate in the process
and are partially excluded. These groups include smallholder
farmers, pastoralists such as the Maasai, agro-pastoralists like the
Sukuma and forest dependent communities such as the Barbaig,
as well as those in the opposition.
The Political Economy of Knowledge
Finally, we focus on the politics of knowledge and expertise
and the ways in which it frames the nature of the trade-offs
countries face and the preferred means of dealing with them. In
other words, whose knowledge counts? Given the complexity of
the interface between climate and food and agricultural systems,
policy makers depend on “epistemic communities” (Haas, 1990)
of experts and advisers to advise on areas of consensus and
uncertainty and to offer guidance about appropriate responses.
From the authority which is deferred or delegated to them,
scientists and other experts can accrue significant agenda-setting
power as “knowledge brokers” (Litfin, 1994) that translate expert
opinion into actionable interventions by states.
The presence of global institutions and knowledge brokers
in the countries in question is significant here. In Kenya,
the presence of major international research and development
organizations such as the World Agroforestry Center (ICRAF),
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and
others means the opportunities for these institutions to directly
engage and shape policy are pronounced. Rwanda also hosts
the Sustainable Development Goals Center for Africa (SDGC/A)
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which plays a key role in terms of shaping the agenda for
its Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
(EDPRS) and influencing its strategic actions through provision
of required technical support to align national priorities (through
EDPRS) with SDGs. As a key knowledge implementation broker,
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN)
continues to be actively engaged in shaping the sector strategies
through their active participation in knowledge seminars, review
workshops and validation meetings. Additionally, once final
draft strategies are available they are immediately shared with
the ministry for final review and approval. At this stage,
MINECOFIN undertakes an assessment of the sector’s strategy
compliance with EDPRS, SDGs and CAADP. As part of that
process, the ministry also invites SDGC/A to review, comment
and provide their inputs over the given sector strategy with
regards to its compliance with SDGs targets.
External knowledge brokers such as FAO, IFAD, World Bank,
and other major international agencies, are often involved in
key policy and strategy development activities in the African
region. International experts are frequently brought in to
the region to advise and work with government staff during
the formulation and development of sector strategies and
programmes. For example, in Rwanda the development of the
Fourth Strategic Plan for Agricultural Transformation, which is
now under development, is being undertaken by international
experts commissioned by FAO and European Union. These
actors play an important steering role as knowledge brokers,
serving as transmission belts for the ideas, methodologies, and
preferred policy proscriptions of their funders. During the
drafting of the Country Agriculture Sector Strategy Results
Framework a retreat of MINAGRI high ranked staff and expert
was facilitated by FAO. Another example is the process of
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) of the Agriculture
Sector in Rwanda Development, 2011. This study was initiated,
funded and commissioned by European Union Delegation in
Rwanda. During this time, the study was conducted by a team of
international experts from consortium Safege (a consulting firm
based in Belgium).
Rwanda’s Green Growth and Climate Resilience National
Strategy was also funded by DFID through the Climate and
Development Knowledge Network (CDKN) and developed by
advisers at the Smith School of Enterprise and Environment at
the University of Oxford. In the case of Kenya’s national climate
strategy, a CDKN sponsored advisor was placed directly in the
Vice-President’s Office to influence and oversee the process of
its formulation. Given the nature of Rwanda’s strategy, during
its formulation and development each targeted sector including
agriculture was assigned an international expert who worked
with the sector stakeholders in order to gather accurate data
and information about the sector. After data collection, review,
analysis, processing, and packaging a sector working paper
with more detailed information was produced. Following the
production of the papers, the experts met and compiled the
information gathered from different sectors into a single report.
The final report is composed of 14 plans of actions and each plan
has various targets and indicators and a proposed sector to lead
its implementation under overall supervision of MINECOFIN
and the Ministry of National Resources of Rwanda (MINIRENA)
ensuring direct government buy-in to donor proscriptions.
In a similar vein, a project implementation support mission
is conducted at least once per year by IFAD in Rome.
Normally, this mission is composed of international experts who
review progress on implementation, identify specific challenges
and assess project compliance with project objectives, and its
pertinence to national, regional and global targets (including the
SDGs and CAADP, etc). At the end of their mission, these experts
usually produce a report with a rating of the project performance
against its design targets and propose key actions in order to
improve the overall performance against different criteria.
The World Bank has also been analyzing CSA policy and
implementation in Africa and other regions since 2016. The
agency has designed a set of “CSA Policy Indicators” to
assess the enabling environment in the form of policy and
institutional frameworks, and services and infrastructure, within
a country supporting the implementation of CSA (World Bank,
2016). The index is derived from 14 indicators (comprised
of 31 sub-indicators) clustered into three broad themes: (1)
Readiness Mechanism; (2) Services and Infrastructure, and
(3) Coordination Mechanism aligned with the claimed “triple
wins” of productivity, resilience, and mitigation to gauge the
progress of countries in implementing CSA (World Bank, 2016;
Braimoh et al., 2017). The CSA Policy Index is meant to
enable policy makers to use the index to identify gaps and to
assess the full potential to support implementation of Climate
Smart Agriculture policies and programmes (Ijeoma et al., 2015;
Braimoh et al., 2017). Specifically, it help policy makers and other
practitioners gauge the extent to which policies, frameworks,
economic structure, social structure, and governance structure
are conducive for supporting CSA implementation. The first
theme, the “Readiness Mechanism,” refers to the capacity
of countries to plan and deliver adaptation and mitigation
programs in ways that are catalytic and fully integrated with
national agricultural development priorities. It also measures the
country’s capacity to leverage investments for climate action and
incentivise adoption of new technologies. The second theme,
“Services and Infrastructure,” measures the country’s institutional
capacity to mainstream CSA, including how effectively a country
can mobilize and coordinate across its various ministries
and stakeholders to support CSA implementation. The third
theme, the “Coordination Mechanism,” is designed to assess
collaboration for disaster risk management and coordination
among the sectors involved in CSA.
The World Bank’s Africa Climate Business Plan (ACBP),
which was launched at the 21st Session of the Conference of
the Parties (COP 21) in Paris in 2015, calls for US$19 billion
in new funding to help the countries of the region to adapt
to climate change and strengthen the continent’s resilience to
climate shocks. A review of the progress in implementing the
ACBP using the CSA Policy Index and indicators was carried
out in 2018 to assess the extent to which African countries have
adopted CSA policies and created the enabling environment for
implementation (World Bank, 2018). Most African countries
scored low on the CSA policy indicators, especially the Readiness
Mechanism, Services and Infrastructure, and an “Aggregated
Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems | www.frontiersin.org 11 August 2019 | Volume 3 | Article 55
Newell et al. Climate Smart Agriculture
Policy Index” (linked to the “Coordination Index”). The review’s
findings indicates that they face critical challenges related to
leveraging investments for climate action, promoting adoption of
new technologies, providing enabling services, and creating the
necessary institutions for CSA implementation.
Interestingly, of the four countries reviewed for this study,
two countries—Tanzania and Rwanda—were among the top
performers (with API scores of 75.6 and 73.3%, respectively),
while the other two—Kenya and Ethiopia—fell just below the
average of 60.1% at 58.6 and 57.9%.
Tanzania’s relatively high score in the index (API of
76%) is driven primarily by its scores in Services and
Infrastructure and Coordination Mechanisms, as described
above. Its commitment to addressing climate adaptation and
mitigation in the agriculture sector is reflected in the country’s
NAPA and National Climate Change Strategy. Beyond these
two plans, the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction
of Poverty (NSGRP II) also incorporates climate change as a
crosscutting issue. With an API score of 73%, Rwanda is another
top performer in the index. Its commitment to CSA is reflected
in the National Strategy for Climate Change and Low Carbon
Development. The strategy includes a monitoring framework
for its mitigation and adaptation programmes and involves
various ministries, including MINAGRI, as well as the Ministry
of Infrastructure (MININFRA) and Municipal Authorities, in
its implementation. The country’s Strategic Program for Climate
Resilience (SPCR) developed through amulti-stakeholder process
focuses on agricultural resilience, sustainable landscapes, and
strengthening institutional capacity among others. The country
also has established several public-private partnerships to develop
services and infrastructure, such as crop insurance that have
the potential to create a strong enabling environment for CSA.
Compared to most other African states, Rwanda also scored
highly in agricultural adaptation policy, agricultural mitigation
policy, agricultural R&D, social safety nets, national GHG
inventory system, and disaster risk management coordination.
In providing strategic advice and evidence, the World
Bank, and other international agencies are acting as key
interlocutors between expert communities and policy-makers,
evaluating project and policy compliance. Knowledge brokers
from scientific, economic and technical institutions, including
international agencies and consultancies, play an important
part in shaping how governments respond to the trade-offs of
governing SDGs and CSA in practice.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have sought to improve upon understandings
of the diverse ways in which governments are coming to terms
with the synergies and trade-offs around the simultaneous
implementation of SDGs, in particular how it relates to climate
change and agriculture. Using the example of climate smart
agriculture, our analysis has sought to generate explanations
for that diversity based on an account of governance and
the role of the state, the ways in which commitments are
translated and domesticated, the degree of policy autonomy
and developmental space countries have to align global goals
and indicators with their own national circumstances and
preferences, and finally the role of knowledge brokers in
identifying areas for intervention and shaping the preferred
metrics of evaluation and performance. The interface between
climate change and agriculture is particularly key in a region of
the world where its effective and inclusive management is vital to
the livelihoods of millions of the poor. Despite the proliferation
of guides, indicators and “tool-kits” for SDG implementation
and the growing market for consultancy in helping governments
demonstrate compliance with the 17 global goals and 232
indicators, we have argued that there is a pressing need to
understand the different routes by which states, market actors
and civil societies in different parts of the world will manage the
simultaneous implementation of goals across competing policy
areas, where vested interests and nested networks are battling for
resources and authority in financially constrained environments.
There is often a gap then between “global imaginaries” of how
the SDGs will be delivered and the messy political economy of
everyday implementation. The reality of how different regions
and social groups deal with these challenges on the ground is
often very different from the way projects are imagined by donors
and multilateral development banks and regional institutions.
Others have noted a “triple disconnect” between the global,
national, and local scales as the trade-offs inherent in dealing
with the political and ecological connections between SDGs are
negotiated across levels of authority (Karlsson et al., 2018). Added
to this is the fact that the language of “synergy” and “integration”
around the SDG objectives masks the reality of institutional
jockeying for position between global governance institutions
at the international level, among governmental departments at
the national level, and between national and local government
actors who seek to position themselves to benefit from new
resource flows associated with climate finance and the SDGs
(Newell et al., 2018).
Our findings here lend weight to those conclusions where
we have found that this competition tends to reproduce
siloed policy practices within government and development
agencies. Siloes and sector-based approaches become entrenched
because financial and decision-making lines of authority are
sector-based. Trade-offs and turf wars exist not just between
ministries at national level, but between central and local
government, as we saw in the case of Kenya. Due to
devolution, the national government ministries only set the
broad policy agenda as agricultural policy is devolved to
county level. They, therefore, do not have to navigate the
trade-offs. The difficult politics of translation get consciously
delegated downwards.
Global interventions look different once translated into
diverse domestic political and economic settings and refracted
through local institutional processes. But this is not just about
weaker states having policies imposed from above or outside. The
case of aid-dependent Ethiopia asserting its autonomy affords
an interesting case in point. As others have noted, competition
between agencies, differing interests, and the very ambiguity of
terms such as CSA, can create opportunities, as well as challenges,
for national and local government officials to acquire authority
Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems | www.frontiersin.org 12 August 2019 | Volume 3 | Article 55
Newell et al. Climate Smart Agriculture
and resources by invoking the label “climate smart” (Newell and
Taylor, 2018). For example, a Ministry of Agriculture official
in Kenya noted that “CSA has become synonymous with best
practice agricultural interventions. . . .Arguably, every project in
Kenya is climate linked and is therefore “climate smart” . . .
Nowadays even the roads have to be “climate smart!” (pers.
comm. 2017).
This underscores the need to engage with the “messy” politics
of SDG implementation in a diversity of contexts and not assume
there are easily transferable ways of getting countries to manage
the inter-linkages between SDGs. As Naess et al. argue (2015,
p. 543) “attempts to work with or against the grain of politics
in a particular setting require an appreciation of the social and
political networks and relations of power which will determine
how the trade-offs inherent to climate change and development
goals are worked through and on whose behalf.” Strategies will
have to go with the grain and reflect national political, economic,
and socio-cultural circumstances (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi,
2014), understanding where political settlements lie (Khan,
2010) and where scope exists for building alliances of actors
around more inclusive and progressive visions of climate smart
agriculture compatible with the SDGs.
This paper thus illustrates the value of political economy
analysis. It can help explain how incumbent power and resistance
to change and why power inequities and institutional inertia
make change hard to achieve. Furthermore, it can also show
where windows of opportunity might lie, where new alliances
might be possible and alternative framings might open up
spaces for policy responses that are more attuned to the needs
of poorer groups, and that leave open multiple avenues of
agricultural development that are compatible with the twin needs
for decarbonization and resilience, rather than locking in one
dominant trajectory.
Regarding the strategic and political value of exploring these
possibilities, we concur with the assertion that “apart from the
argument that integration of climate policy and development
goals can achieve synergies, improve effectiveness and avoid
trade-offs, we consider that their integration would be likely
to increase the social acceptability and political feasibility of
emissions reductions in contexts and countries where historical
contributions to climate change have been negligible” (Naess
et al., 2015, p. 535). Indeed, political economy analysis for
examining the challenges and opportunities for implementing
“climate-resilient agriculture” for achieving multiple SDGs
cannot be reduced to a generic tool to manage change on
terms set by powerful external actors, nor as a shorthand for
highlighting governance failures in already weak and struggling
states. Rather, it should serve as a useful starting point for
an informed discussion about who is benefiting, and more
importantly, who is not, from existing ways of addressing
multiple goals, how and why this is the case, and what can be
done about it (Naess et al., 2015).
Viewed this way, the challenge of identifying inter-linkages
across SDGs, isolating potential big “wins” around multiple
synergies and minimizing negative trade-offs cannot be reduced
to a technocratic mapping or benchmarking exercise. Nor can
it result in plug-in “one size fits all” toolkits that countries
can adopt. Foregrounding questions of power, politics, political
economy, governance, institutions, and knowledge is not
designed only to demonstrate the importance of context or the
need to engage with the messy realities of policy implementation.
It also allows us to identify which pathways to managing
SDGs are being designed, why, on whose behalf and with what
implications. That surely is the starting point for constructing
processes that are more inclusive, sustainable and effective in
delivering a truly “smart” and even transformative agricultural
future for all in a warming world.
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